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ABSTRACT: This essay takes up practices of comparison and analogy 
between human populations and animals that have been so problem-
atized in discussions of J. M. Coetzee’s work. Through readings of Der-
rida and Haraway alongside German novelist Uwe Timm’s Morenga, it 
argues that analogical structures function as simultaneous differentia-
tions and de-differentiations that allow for both similarities and dif-
ferences to emerge. Far from collapsing differences, analogical think-
ing in Timm’s novel allows for specificities to emerge, rendering the 
broad, generic category of the animal far more complex.
In 2005, the College Board, which administers high school students’ 
most dreaded exam—the SAT—dropped one of its most challeng-
ing sections: analogies. New York Times journalist Adam Cohen de-
cried this move, pointing out that “[w]e are living in the age of the 
false, often shameless, analogy.”1 Examples of this shamelessness 
include conservative activist Grover Norquist’s comparison of the 
estate tax with the Holocaust and Enron’s Kenneth Lay’s analogy 
between attacks on Enron and terrorist attacks on the United States. 
These types of misleading analogies operate as “the dominant mode 
of public discourse,” and thus, Cohen argues, “the ability to tell true 
analogies from false analogies has never been more important.”2 
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 Analogies for Cohen—and many others in the humanities and 
sciences—are about logical thought. They are “the core of cogni-
tion”3 and rest at the center of building philosophical, scientific, 
legal, and political arguments in establishing the boundaries of 
knowledge and pushing toward new discoveries and perspectives. It 
is, therefore, somewhat surprising that analogical thinking has got-
ten such a bad rap in animal studies, an emerging interdisciplinary 
field of scholarly, activist, and artistic work that studies animals and 
human/animal relationships, with a focus on “questions of represen-
tation and agency” as literary scholar Susan McHugh notes.4 These 
questions, as one of animal studies’ leading figures, Cary Wolfe, ar-
gues, are not just about paying attention to animals; they are funda-
mentally about “destabilizing or throwing into radical question the 
schema of the human” and the humanist traditions that structure 
Western cultures.5
 Analogical thinking, many suggest, is humanist in its orientation 
and often uses human standards, histories, and practices to under-
stand nonhuman entities and lives. For activists and scholars like 
Carol Adams (1995)6 and Donna Haraway (2008),7 among others, 
analogies collapse differences and efface the particularly located ma-
terial and historical interactions that produce the lives and deaths 
of animals. Analogies are thus said to contribute to generic thinking 
about animals. Yet, analogies can also set the stage for more rigorous 
comparisons through which the specificity and historicity of differ-
ent animalities might emerge. In what follows, I aim to show that 
analogical thinking is not merely about equating the terms of anal-
ogy; rather, it is about thinking through similarity and difference. I 
first examine Jacques Derrida’s uses of analogies in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am in showing that analogy is at the heart of his move 
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from the singular, generic “animal” to the multiple, heterogeneous 
“l’animot.” 
 After examining Derrida, I turn to Haraway’s When Species Meet 
and its approach to animal pain and death in science laboratories in 
critiquing the “killability” of instrumental, “faceless” animals. My 
discussions of Derrida and Haraway set the stage for my subsequent 
reading of the German novel Morenga, an account of German colo-
nialism in South-West Africa at the turn of the twentieth century, 
published by Uwe Timm in 1978. The animals and animal deaths in 
Timm’s novel are a far cry from the calculated animal deaths in lab-
oratories and slaughterhouses, but they are examples of large-scale 
exterminism. In reading Timm’s novel, I critically reassess analogical 
thinking when it comes to both animals and people: the tendency 
to liken colonial subjects to animals, the tendency to liken animals 
to children, the practice of describing animal deaths, particularly in 
the food industry, as genocides or holocausts. Morenga, I show, offers 
examples of analogical thinking that work multidirectionally to ar-
ticulate a wide range of plural animalities and histories. My analysis 
of Morenga grounds my argument that analogy is crucial to find-
ing nonhumanist ways of thinking about, narrating, and interacting 
with animals. 
 Animal studies has long been engaged in complicating generic 
understandings of the animal. One of the major sources for this work 
is Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, a collection that articu-
lates the concept of l’animot. A play on the French words animal 
and mot (word), l’animot is central to Derrida’s critique of the West-
ern philosophical tradition’s homogenized, monolithic use of the 
term the animal to stand in for any nonhuman creature. L’animot, a 
homophone for the plural animaux, is “an irreducible living mul-
tiplicity of mortals” that includes humans and catalyzes Derrida’s 
move away from the singular, generic l’animal and its traditional 
opposition to the human.8
One of the central tensions in Derrida’s writing, which is cru-
cial to thinking about analogies and animals, is that between dif-
ferentiation and de-differentiation. Derrida’s l’animot is a move to de- 
differentiate humans and nonhuman animals; at the same time, 
it works towards differentiation through multiplicity. This tension 
is staged through analogy in Derrida’s text—albeit through a cau-
tious analogy that draws attention to the plight of animals in sys-
tems of mass extermination (farming, industry, science, and so on) 
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operating on an unprecedented scale. Derrida explains that in the 
face of these practices of violent “subjection,” people tend to “do 
all they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from 
themselves in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or 
misunderstanding of this violence, which some would compare to 
the worst cases of genocide.”9 He goes on to note that “[o]ne should 
neither abuse the figure of genocide nor too quickly consider it ex-
plained away.”10 In other words, although this analogy is illustrative, 
Derrida cautions against using human genocide as a framework for 
understanding “the contemporary plight of animals” both because 
this move potentially undermines the histories and specificities of 
human genocides and provides an un-situated, facile explanation 
for the lives and deaths of animals in industrial societies. 
From this cautionary note, he moves on to explain the “annihila-
tion of certain species” through the quintessential analogy to Nazi 
genocide: 
As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens and gas chambers 
(let’s say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduc-
tion and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artifi-
cial insemination, so that, being continually more numerous and better fed, 
they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of 
the imposition of genetic experimentation, or extermination by gas or by 
fire.11
Derrida’s invocation of this analogy is hypothetical (“as if”); it is 
also a reversal of the traditional analogy. It conditionally reimagines 
the Holocaust through late-twentieth-century practices vis-à-vis ani-
mals in order to portray the ways in which animal extermination is 
not like the Nazi Holocaust. Here, Derrida thus both cautions against 
analogical thinking and recognizes its usefulness in pushing philo-
sophical thinking about and with animals. 
His use of the analogy between industrialized animal practices 
and the Holocaust stresses the fact that analogies have two terms. 
Thus, a comparison between animal extermination and the Holo-
caust operates in two directions: likening animal extermination to 
the Holocaust and likening the Holocaust to animal extermination. 
As Derrida’s inversion of the traditional order of the analogy shows, 
animal extermination in industrial cultures is, in some significant 
ways, not at all like Nazi practices during the Holocaust. In this way, 
Creedon / Difference in animalities and Histories 311
12. Cohen, “An SAT Without Analogies Is Like” (above, n. 1).
13. Ibid.
14. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am (above, n. 8), p. 26. 
15. The critique of rights-based discourse is now fairly widespread. One of the canoni-
Derrida shows us that analogical thinking is very deliberately not 
about equating the terms of analogy, but rather about thinking mul-
tidirectionally through difference in a context of potential similarity. 
Comparing anything to Nazi history, of course, relies rhetorically 
upon the absolute certainty that it is a horror that no one would 
condone replicating. To return to Cohen’s explanation of analogies, 
“[t]he power of an analogy is that it can persuade people to transfer 
the feeling of certainty they have about one subject to another sub-
ject about which they may not have formed an opinion.”12 In this 
case, Derrida invokes Nazi history to show that the processes behind 
animal reproduction, use, testing, and death are arguably crueler 
and more inhuman than Nazi practices vis-à-vis Jews; they are, in 
short, “alike in some ways and different in other ways.”13 
 Derrida recognizes the emotional manipulation that such analo-
gies perform and is quick to move out of “pathos” through an ap-
peal to reason and common sense. “Everyone knows what the pro-
duction, breeding, transport, and slaughter of these animals has 
become,” he writes.14 Instead of dwelling in material violence, he 
moves to the conceptual violence that inheres in collapsing the 
specificity of animals into the broad construction of the animal. For 
Derrida, the physical and material violence that animals experience 
at the hands and machineries of human cultures is attributable to 
the nameless, faceless notion of the generic animal. Despite the 
crucial role that analogical thinking plays in Derrida’s arguments, 
scholars in animal and literary studies alike have tended to overlook 
it. This oversight is likely attributable to the fact that the analogy 
between the Holocaust and industrialized animal slaughter is one 
of the most contested in animal studies—for its “pathos,” in Der-
rida’s terms, and its usual association with human/animal “rights,” 
a hotly debated issue in the field.15 
Haraway has been one of the most outspoken voices against ana-
logical thinking in animal studies, particularly in When Species Meet, 
a book that examines a variety of human/animal encounters that 
produce animal deaths. Not unlike Derrida, she argues that it is not 
just killing animals, but making them killable as generic, faceless be-
ings that is the central problem of the way the humanist tradition 
has constructed the animal. In a chapter titled “Sharing Suffering,” 
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she addresses animal suffering and death in laboratories that work 
to make discoveries to better human life. Haraway reframes animals 
in laboratories by approaching them not just as the useless victims 
of science, but as workers who are “response-able”: “People and ani-
mals in labs are both subjects and objects to each other in ongoing 
intra-action.”16 
This move is part of a larger project in animal studies to recog-
nize animals as actors, if not agents in their own right. In the field, 
agency is considered to be “partial, local, limited” and situational 
for both humans and animals.17 Because agency and subjectivity 
are frequently functions of the traditional humanist subject, schol-
ars have been deconstructing conventional humanist notions of 
absolute agency and subjectivity in arguing for the situatedness of 
agency, intentionality, and power. Thus, animal studies’ work about 
agency revolves around foregrounding “animals’ own novel forms 
of agency . . . [and] related abilities—in language, in reasoning” that 
are often obscured by humanist assumptions.18 
Haraway’s work highlights that animal objectification and op-
pression in the lab are the results of human unwillingness to see ani-
mals as able of response and interaction. As she writes, “instrumen-
tal relations of people and animals are not themselves the root of 
turning animals (or people) into dead things, into machines whose 
reactions are of interest but who have no presence, no face, that de-
mands recognition, caring, and shared pain.”19 It is the assump-
tion of unidirectional relations in the use of animals that ensures 
that they remain facelessly generic. For Haraway, as for Derrida and 
others, the discourse of “rights” for such human/animal relations 
is out of place because rights is a humanist discourse that effaces 
the specific modes of being of the animals who work with and for 
us. As Paul Patton notes in his contribution to Zoontologies, human/
animal relationships are “hierarchical and communicative,”20 and 
as such are structured around “requirements and obligations [that] 
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are always specific to the beings involved.”21 Given these structures, 
he argues (in the context of animal training) “that certain kinds of 
emphasis on equality in all contexts are not only misleading but 
dangerous.”22 
This line of thinking and argument among some scholars in 
animal studies has encouraged the development of two diverging 
movements: one group of activist, rights-inflected “critical animal 
studies” proponents follows in the footsteps of activists like Peter 
Singer and Tom Regan and the animal rights movement; another 
group of nonactivist scholars, wary of rights discourses and equal-
ity and often now considered to be engaging in “animality stud-
ies,” works in the tradition of Derrida, Haraway, and Wolfe.23 Animal 
studies remains an umbrella term for both branches of this recent 
animal-focused work. 
For Haraway, the “answer” to unequal relationships between hu-
mans and animals is not to take animals out of labs. Her approach 
to lab animals underscores both the use-value of animals for sci-
ence and the fact that giving animals a “face” is not about human-
ist notions of intrinsic value. She notes that “inequality in the lab 
is . . . not of a humanist kind . . . but of a relentlessly historical and 
contingent kind that never stills the murmur of nonteleological and 
nonhierarchical multiplicity.”24 The suffering of animals is not hu-
man, but this does not mean that humans cannot share in animal 
suffering. Sharing suffering is about working with animals in ways 
that “never leave the practitioners in moral comfort, sure of their 
righteousness.”25 For both Haraway and Derrida, it is clear that ani-
mal suffering must be responded to and faced, rather than system-
atically effaced. Paying attention to asymmetries and differences is 
crucial, not to halting animal death, but to ensuring that animals 
become less “killable.”
As the Animal Studies Group (a collective of British scholars in the 
humanities) chronicles in Killing Animals, “[t]he killing of animals is 
a structural feature of all human-animal relations.”26 The vast array 
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of different forms of killing, and the meanings and taboos associ-
ated with them, highlights a point that Haraway also stresses: “[k]ill-
ing an animal is rarely simply a matter of animal death.”27 Some ani-
mals are more “killable” than others. Animals like rats, pigeons, and 
geese are often seen as “trash animals,” whereas the deaths of mam-
mals (monkeys, cows, dogs) and other “charismatic megafauna” are 
frequently met with more horror and public outcry.28 Recently, for 
example, the February 2014 killing of a giraffe at the Denmark Zoo 
to prevent in-breeding provoked international outrage. 
 For Haraway, the use-value of many forms of animal deaths re-
quires an emphasis on the “killability” of animals, and not just their 
deaths. The discourse of rights and its emphasis on intrinsic value 
obfuscates the “multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing . . . 
[and] the capacity to respond in relentless historical, nonteleologi-
cal, multispecies contingency.”29 Rights discourses and their em-
phases on the humanist intrinsic value of animals often facilitate 
a distancing from real and immediate deaths and a covering up of 
death’s cultural necessity, which can increase the number and cru-
elty of animal deaths. As the Animal Studies Group points out, most 
animal rights and animal welfare movements “reinforce the taboos 
to ensure the normal invisibility of animal killing and to keep the 
implications of such killing even further from public conscious-
ness.”30 For Haraway, the extermination of animals that the rights 
discourse is deployed to address is not a function of killing, but of 
making beings killable. “Perhaps,” she remarks, “the commandment 
should read, ‘Thou shalt not make killable.’”31 Part of this revision 
entails rigorously facing the inevitability of, and the responsibilities 
that come with, killing animals. To ensure dynamic, ethical relation-
ships with animals, Haraway writes, “[h]uman beings must learn to 
kill responsibly. . . . I do not think we can nurture living until we get 
better at facing killing.”32 
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 This chapter of When Species Meet relies upon Haraway’s reading 
of J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999) and The Lives of Animals (2001),33 
which both figure prominently in animal studies. They are a “touch-
stone” to the essays of Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John Mc-
Dowell, Ian Hacking, and Wolfe in their Philosophy and Animal Life 
(2008).34 Wendy Woodward’s analysis of southern African narratives 
in The Animal Gaze (2008) relies upon Coetzee’s works,35 which also 
appear in Wolfe’s What Is Posthumanism? (2010) and McHugh’s Ani-
mal Stories (2011).36 Coetzee’s books are a jumping off point for Anat 
Pick’s Creaturely Poetics (2011) and a primary inspiration for Kari 
Weil’s Thinking Animals (2012).37 Rare is the work in animal studies 
that does not contend with Coetzee.38 Haraway’s treatment of the 
novels is less extensive than others’, but is crucial to her discussion 
of killability—and to her critique of the use of analogies for thinking 
about animal death.
Although other scholars have discussed the layered nuances of 
Coetzee’s works in more complex terms, for Haraway, the difference 
between Coetzee’s novels lies in Elizabeth Costello’s uncritical em-
brace of the universalizing discourses of rights in The Lives of Animals 
as compared to the “face-to-face life with dogs and humans” por-
trayed in Disgrace, particularly in the context of characters escorting 
dogs to their euthanized deaths. Both books treat the intersections 
among racial histories, the subjection of animals, and the animal-
ization of oppression. The self-righteous Costello, Haraway tells us, 
“inhabits a radical language of animal rights. . . . She flinches at 
none of this discourse’s universal claims, and she embraces all of its 
power to name extreme atrocity. She practices the enlightenment 
method of comparative history in order to fix the awful equality 
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of slaughter. Meat eating is like the Holocaust; meat eating is the 
Holocaust.”39 The effacement of difference in such a position, for 
Haraway, perpetuates killability in its universalizing and totalizing 
language, which refuses to see specific human and animal lives.
Costello’s equation of meat consumption and the Holocaust is 
a reversal of Derrida’s invocation of that same analogy: instead of 
considering the terms of analogy as distinct and historically specific, 
Costello collapses meat consumption into the Holocaust. Although 
her comparative practices in Coetzee’s novels have garnered much 
critical attention, animal studies has largely ignored other possible 
forms of analogical thinking and comparison by privileging Coet- 
zee’s character as the (negative) model for such thinking. 
If Costello gives animal studies a crucial example of analogical 
thinking working in the service of universalizing discourses that flat-
ten history and perpetuate generic notions of animal life and death, 
I want to turn now to a different novel that offers up analogical 
thinking that works multidirectionally to articulate a range of plural 
animalities and histories. Timm’s Morenga emerges from a different 
context than Coetzee’s novels, but it nonetheless raises some similar 
questions, particularly about the killability of animals and its rela-
tionship to analogical historical thinking and its potential values. 
In what follows, I provide a reading of alternative uses of analogical 
thinking about and for animals—one that is more in keeping with 
Derrida’s dialogic use of analogy in highlighting both similarities 
and differences between individual and collective animal and hu-
man lives and deaths. 
The German novel Morenga,40 published in 1978 and translated 
into English in 2003,41 has held a significant place in German stud-
ies, but has not been read at all in the context of animal studies, 
despite the permeating presence of animals throughout the text.42 
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Timm is a major contemporary German writer who has written his-
torical novels, children’s books, and screenplays since the publica-
tion of his first novel in 1974. Morenga, a historical fiction about Ger-
man colonialism in South-West Africa (current-day Namibia), was 
his third novel. Built on fragments of the veterinarian-protagonist 
Gottschalk’s diaries, historical and fictional flashbacks, and German 
and English military documents—the novel is noteworthy, in part, 
as a 2003 New York Times Book Review commentary by English writer 
Giles Foden notes, for its “lack of deep characterization”43—that is, 
of course, of human characters. The main “character” of the novel, 
one might say, is “Germany’s little war” against the native Hereros, 
who revolted in 1904 under the leadership of the ambiguous figure 
Morenga. The novel covers a period from approximately 1850 to the 
end of the war in 1907.
Animals appear throughout the novel in each of the historical 
scenarios the book presents surrounding different human charac-
ters: Gottschalk, the veterinarian, who serves in the Herero war from 
1904 to 1907; Gorth, the sheep-like missionary, who roams the pro-
tectorate in the 1850s; Klügge, the trader whose oxen drag a huge bar-
rel of brandy across the desert to sell alcohol in various settlements 
in the 1860s; Treptow, the technophile land surveyor, whose work 
is facilitated by the draft oxen who pull him around the German 
territories in the 1880s and who plans to reroute the Nile through 
the Sahara to cause beneficial climate change. The novel jumps 
among these time periods frequently, with little tying them together 
other than geographic consistency, colonialism, and a genealogy 
of the animals who work with and for the humans from one time 
period to the next. It is this genealogy of human/animal relations 
in South-West Africa—invisible to the novel’s human characters— 
that structures the text. Although the human characters from the 
different historical periods in the plot are unconnected to one an-
other, the animal characters across the time periods represented are 
related and bring the novel’s disparate historical moments and char-
acters together. 
Readers learn about this animal genealogy when Gottschalk is 
called to the aid of a cow, whose unborn calf is stuck in the birth 
canal, and he surgically removes the calf to save the cow. After the 
bloody procedure, Gottschalk asks one of the native African men to 
repeat the cow’s name, and we learn the following:
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[it is] a melodic name with several clicks, which meant Soft-Mouth in Ger-
man. . . . Soft-Mouth was a descendant of White-Mouth, who had once stood 
among the sacred herd beside the ancestral fire of the Herero chief Zeraas, and 
whose daughter Long-Tuft had been stolen by Jonker Afrikaners’ people and 
thus passed into the hands of the Hottentots in Warmbad. But Gottschalk 
heard only a mooing cow. He understood nothing. Otherwise he could have 
heard all about Big-Red, who pulled Missionary Gorth’s wagon into this land, 
or of Christopherus, who had brought Klügge’s mighty brandy barrel to thirsty 
Bethany, or of the most famous pathfinder of all draft oxen, Fox-Horn, who 
pulled the surveyor Treptow safely and surely through the plains and deserts.44 
This passage highlights several points about the animals in Morenga 
and the humans who work with them. First, it stresses the fact that 
this “animal history” is unknown and unknowable to the humans 
in the novel, including Gottschalk, the character portrayed as caring 
the most about animal well-being. Timm’s novel predates the emer-
gence of animal studies, but, as this passage suggests, it raises some 
of the challenges that animal studies scholars have addressed sur-
rounding the notion of “animal history.” As Erica Fudge notes in her 
essay “A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals,” one 
of the difficulties with conceiving of animal history is the fact that 
animals are “inarticulate” and therefore cannot leave documents be-
hind. Any animal history is, therefore, by definition a history of hu-
man perceptions of animals. Fudge and other scholars suggest that 
“the history of animals . . . is impossible” as such.45
 Despite this impossibility, scholars insist on the need to write the 
history of animals in the interests of working toward reconceptual-
izing the human. Fudge writes that “[t]he inevitable centrality of 
the human in the history of animals . . . need not be regarded as 
a failing, because if a history of animals is to be distinctive it must 
offer us what we might call an ‘interspecies competence’; that is, a 
new way of thinking about and living with animals.”46 This “new” 
pathway must lead to the end of a simple opposition between hu-
man and animal and to surrender notions of human exceptionalism 
and intrinsic value. Indeed, Fudge’s more recent monograph, Bru-
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tal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern En- 
gland (2006), argues for the centrality of animals in conceiving of 
the human and of human reasoning in the early modern period. 
The book exemplifies the inseparability of human and animal his-
tory. The presence of animals in historical and literary texts is not just 
figurative, she argues, and reading animals literally is about taking 
them seriously and “recover[ing] animals from the silence of modern 
scholarship.”47 Human history in this work is inextricable from ani-
mals, and, likewise, animals are “recoverable” through human texts. 
 The animal history posited in Morenga is obviously channeled 
through the text’s human author, but the novel’s history of animals 
portrays them as both literal and figurative actors in human lives 
and texts. The animal histories in the novel provide an alternative 
to other forms of narrative structure and logic. For Morenga, as a 
historical fiction, narrative does not function chronologically, nor 
is it structured around human characters, events, and their relation-
ships; instead, the novel multidirectionally envisions ways of telling 
history and stories through animal genealogies. What emerges is a 
decidedly nonlinear narrative that revolves around layers of differ-
ent kinds of human/animal relationships and their specific asymme-
tries. Different animals and their histories in Morenga work toward 
envisioning different narrative structures, perspectives, and ways 
of narrating the past. As McHugh notes in Animal Stories, “other 
creatures become important not as supplements to human subject 
forms but rather as actors . . . shaping . . . a range of other narrative 
forms.”48 
In narrating a story through animal genealogies, Morenga points 
to the limitations of traditional linear, humanist narrative struc-
tures. Timm’s novel is a testament to the fact that there is always 
more going on than humans can see or know. Yet, despite this ig-
norance, Morenga makes clear that human action is conditioned by 
a wide range of choices that have ethical and material ramifications 
for people and animals. Although Gottschalk is unaware of the his-
tory of the animals he comes into contact with, he nonetheless 
treats Soft-Mouth as an individual being with specific characteris-
tics, including a name and a distinguishing appearance. Moreover, 
he is one of the few characters who does not treat her as “killable,” 
in Haraway’s terms. He cares enough to save her life, unlike most 
of the other Germans in Morenga. One of the other veterinarians, 
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Dr. Haring, comes upon Gottschalk performing the life-saving pro-
cedure on Soft-Mouth and asks: “What’s the point of all this bloody 
mess. . . . Why not just let the cow die?” Haring notes that as an 
“experiment,” the medical procedure is “quite interesting,” but it 
otherwise seems unnecessary. Speechless, Gottschalk can only reply: 
“The cow would have died.”49 This scene underlines the difference 
between the cow’s easy killability to Haring when compared to Gott-
schalk’s and the Hottentots’50 clear regard for the animal as a life 
worth saving. For Gottschalk, this regard is about the cow’s intrinsic 
value, but for the Africans, it is about the cow’s practical value: the 
animals are usable currency. 
These different stances vis-à-vis animals carry over to how the 
Germans and Gottschalk treat the native Africans. Morenga draws 
attention to the fact that the killability of animals, which translates 
into the killability of colonial subjects, is at the heart of the colonial 
mindset. Gottschalk, however, does not understand this from the be-
ginning, even though the analogy and proximity between the Afri-
cans and animals are clear from the outset. Shortly after Gottschalk 
arrives in the German protectorate, he encounters two fenced areas 
—one of which contains cattle, and the other, captive natives:
The cattle were a pitiful sight, totally emaciated, many injured by thorns or 
bullets, with festering wounds. Bodies of dead animals lay scattered every-
where. The stench of carrion filled the air.
A large area next to the kraal had been enclosed with barbed wire. Sentries 
were posted in front with fixed bayonets. Beyond the fence Gottschalk could 
see people, or rather skeletons, squatting—no, something halfway between 
humans and skeletons. They huddled together, mostly naked in the piercingly 
hot sun.51 
Gottschalk is told that this fenced area is “our concentration camp.” 
On the fence hangs a sign that reads “Don’t feed the animals.” One 
of his first tasks is to find out why the cattle are dying. As becomes 
apparent, the cattle and the enclosed women and children are starv-
ing to death. Gottschalk initially believes the situation to be “an 
administrative oversight on the part of lower-level bureaucrats,”52 
but he comes to find that it is a plan of systematic extermination.
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 The extermination is obviously based on the assumption that 
the natives are not humans; therefore, they are animals and so kill-
able. As Etienne Balibar observes, “every theoretical racism draws 
upon anthropological universals,” which take as their starting point 
the fundamental difference between humanity and animality.53 
From the beginning of the novel, the native Africans are marked as 
animal-like, and more often than not, interchangeable with ani-
mals. Many of the German officers, for example, relish making the 
veterinarians oversee the execution of native prisoners: “When the 
rebel was lying on the ground, Schwanebach ordered the veterinar-
ian [Gottschalk] to make sure the baboon was dead.”54 This inter-
changeability of the native Africans and animals, however, is also 
one of the ways in which the distinction between animality and 
humanity becomes destabilized. 
 Within the first forty pages of the novel, Gottschalk is told that 
the Africans are bestial and their women sexually “fantastic . . . 
completely immoral, total animals,”55 but soon he begins to notice 
that the Europeans themselves resemble animals. A general’s child 
is described as “black and hairy as a monkey.”56 As the war drags 
on, the German soldiers are compared to animals in their listless-
ness.57 In the historical flashbacks, Missionary Gorth looks like 
a sheep: “And not just any sheep, but, as rumors flying about the 
country for weeks had suggested, a fleecy Merino, which was still 
rare in this region. Was it his long chin, or the narrow bright eyes, 
or his slightly wavy, crinkly hair? As the stranger greeted the waiting 
Hottentots with a gentle smile, his face became even more mark-
edly sheep-like.”58 In another flashback, the brandy-trader Klügge is 
an “elephant.”59 Gottschalk sees the German generals as dogs: their 
mustaches and attentive gazes reminding him of pointers.60 On the 
frontlines, those same generals become rabbit-like, “darting back 
and forth.”61 At one point, Gottschalk himself is compared to a frog. 
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As the Germans come to resemble animals, so also, as Gottschalk 
remarks, does “[t]he external distinction between soldiers and rebels 
. . . [begin] to blur.”62 Animality is at first deployed as a means of 
distinguishing the Africans from the Germans, but animals and ani-
malities become what we might call the “common denominator” 
between both sides. This is so not only because both sides resemble 
animals, but because they are both in relationship with animals in 
ways that are characteristically “human,” even as this category be-
comes unstable. Morenga paints worlds of unequal, asymmetrical 
relationships between humans and animals, among humans, and 
among animals. Animals are parents, children, patients; they are 
sources of labor, food, goods, and aesthetic pleasure. While the novel 
reveals the colonial structures of the Germans’ interactions with the 
Africans, it also underscores that both the Africans and Europeans 
are marked human in their structural relationships to animals. 
Although all the human/animal relationships in the novel are 
marked by inequalities, they are not mappable in simple terms. The 
Germans do not categorically treat animals as killable, and the Afri-
cans do not categorically treat them as individual lives. Under many 
circumstances, the German army does consider animals to be kill-
able, as in the case of Soft-Mouth. In a parallel situation earlier in 
the novel, one of the captains, unable to mount his wildly thrashing 
horse, calls Gottschalk for a diagnosis. The veterinarian finds that 
the captain is wearing cologne to which the horse is likely allergic. 
This display of animal individuality and sensitivity, perhaps agency, 
is a marker of insubordination and the captain has “the horse shot, 
as unfit for duty.”63 Later, however, a corporal riding through enemy 
lines has his horse shot out from under him: “As he reaches the 
battery, his horse collapses beneath him. They count seven bullet 
wounds. He sits down and cries. He’s ridden this horse since the 
revolt began.”64 In this scene, a horse’s death occasions a very differ-
ent response, one that is arguably more dramatic than the response 
to the simultaneous death of an assistant adjutant in the same bat-
tle, which leaves the colonel “noticeably upset” though not bereft.
Likewise, the Africans who safeguard Soft-Mouth are not always 
animal custodians. When ostrich feathers become fashionable hat 
adornments in Europe, the native tribes in the Bethany area employ 
their fastest horses to chase birds to death so that they can barter 
feathers for European goods: “Why didn’t they simply shoot this 
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docile bird? As far as they were concerned, it wasn’t worth the pow-
der.”65 Only when the birds are near extinction do the tribes consider 
other methods of attaining the feathers. In addition, the Hereros and 
the Hottentots engage in cattle wars, stealing cows from each other, 
frequently killing them in the process. But, as a trader explains to 
Klügge in his laying out of economic principles, “[t]he Hottentot 
tribes had to be convinced to move from stealing when forced to for 
food, to systematic cattle theft on economic principles.”66 
Among both the Europeans and the Africans, human/animal 
encounters and the outcomes they produce are a function of the 
multiple, sometimes simultaneous differing roles that animals serve 
vis-à-vis humans: as “technologies” of war (in the case of horses), 
as sources of aesthetic objects (in the case of ostriches), as currency 
(in the case of both ostriches and cattle), and as food (in the case of 
cattle). These specific roles sometimes render animals killable when 
they fail to serve their prescribed purposes, but they also render 
them valuable. 
In addition to serving as technologies, animals inspire the cre-
ation of new technologies in the novel, thus catalyzing human 
“progress.” Gottschalk, for example, develops a model for cow den-
tures: “There was no good reason to slaughter a healthy cow that 
gave good milk just because it had lost a tooth, although he realized 
this hectic pace [of the war] was killing more cows than had been 
lost in the last ten years due to broken teeth.”67 However ironic and 
useless the dentures may seem, not unlike Gottschalk’s procedure 
on Soft-Mouth, the innovation strives to save animal lives that re-
main productive and valuable in a certain economy. 
 This economy is not exclusively human-centered. The cows, for 
example, have a kind of “companion-species” relationship with the 
Hottentots, much like the one Haraway describes between dogs and 
humans in The Companion Species Manifesto (2003)68 and her subse-
quent essay “From Cyborgs to Companion Species” (2004).69 As we 
are told fairly early in the novel, via Gorth’s lead ox, the human/cow 
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relationship emerged out of mutual agreement: “Hurt-Knee . . . the 
ancestor of all Hottentots . . . crept up to a cow that was groaning 
with pain because she had a thorn in her hoof. Then he pulled the 
thorn from her hoof and asked her to give him milk for it. The cow, 
called Dotsy, from whom all of us now in the yoke have descended, 
said to herself: It’s good to have someone who can pull a thorn from 
my hoof, and so she agreed.”70 This story, like Haraway’s discussion 
of lab animals, portrays the cows as actors in the relationship, rather 
than as mere victims or tools. The relationship is similar to Har-
away’s account of dogs’ history with humans—with agency resting 
with the dogs in initiating an exchange that evolved into a compan-
ion-species relationship. 
Even in the companion-species model, however, the relation-
ship between humans and animals is one of use-value: the cow ap-
proaches the human because the cow can use the human, just as 
the human can use the cow. Thus, while human/animal encounters 
produce asymmetrical relationships in which humans have a power 
of life or death over animals, this is not always the case, and each 
human/animal encounter bears its own specifically defined histories 
and circumstances. As Haraway remarks repeatedly, in all cases—
even ones resulting in animal deaths—“[t]he partners do not pre-
cede their relating,” and the relating is never “finished.”71 
The relationships between humans and cows are clearly reconfig-
ured under colonialism through the cattle theft between the Hot-
tentots and Hereros in the time of Gorth and Klügge, and later in 
the constant movement of the Herero uprising. The relationships 
between humans and ostriches are redefined several times in one 
generation, the animals going from being wild and mostly ignored, 
to becoming an overnight commodity, to being a kind of protected 
species. Human/horse relations are also in the process of transforma-
tion, as the Germans seek to introduce camels to the region. (Cam-
els, among a number of other species, including pigs—introduced to 
southern Africa by Gorth—are not native to the region.) Gottschalk 
is charged with testing the feasibility of camel farming in the pro-
tectorate because camels can travel longer distances with less water 
than horses. However, as a lieutenant explains, other technologies, 
in addition to other animals, stand to redefine the status of horses: 
“Admittedly a man felt aristocratic on a horse, but in fact the animal 
was an anachronism, dependent on water, meadow and mood, not 
to speak of such unponderables as the mating urge. The automobile 
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had no such whims. It’s ridiculous the way we run all over the place 
with these stubborn oxen. Think of the possibilities an airplane 
offers.”72 These evolving technological developments, histories, and 
relationships, as well as the differences between species and between 
different populations of the same species, expose the fact that the 
notion of a singular, generic animal fails to account for individual 
animal lives and for animal and human history.
In all of these different histories, Morenga portrays many differ-
ent forms of animality emerging from specific contexts and relation-
ships. These different ways of being animal evolve not only in rela-
tionship with humans, but also in relationship with other animals 
of the same and different species. Oxen emerge from cattle, as the 
novel recounts; ostriches are chased down by horses; camels come 
in to be tested against horses. Animalities emerge in states of friction, 
to use Anna Tsing’s term, between and within species. Tsing’s use 
of friction defines the ways in which natures and cultures “are con-
tinually co-produced in interactions”—“the awkward, unequal, un-
stable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.”73 
Her friction posits a postcolonial, biocultural account of global con-
nection; for Tsing, as for Morenga, “history” as such is always mul-
tiple, emerging through multiple stories and species that intersect 
with and define one another.
In this historical sense, the animal is never separable from the 
human. Furthermore, these multiple animalities that are simultane-
ously within and parallel to Herero, Hottentot, German, Boer, and 
English human populations become a mode of telling history from 
multiple perspectives—histories of movements and relationships. 
What constitutes “humanity,” then, emerges in and with all of these 
animal narratives and analogies—and is equally fluid and open to re-
definition. It is no accident that by the end of the novel, the human/
animal divide is so ambiguous that animals have become humanlike: 
Gottschalk’s camel, for instance, “groans like a man” as it is shot 
down.74 In telling specific histories—stories that give animals “face,” 
to use Haraway’s term—Morenga portrays animals becoming human, 
in much the same way that humans come to resemble animals in 
their lack of “characterization,” to return to Foden’s observation.
In their self-conscious effort to define the human, necessarily 
against the animal, the novel suggests that humans continually land 
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back in the inseparability of humanity and different, plural animali-
ties. In this dynamic, humanity itself is not only difficult to define, 
but necessarily heterogeneous—another set of historically and ma-
terially constituted relational animalities. For Morenga, as for Derrida 
and Haraway, both the human and the animal are categorical ways 
of seeing that disregard and devalue life as fixed and killable. The 
human and the animal, indeed, wind up having little to do with 
individual humans and animals, whose actions and relationships 
do not, in practice, conform to the fixity of these categories. Colo-
nialism as a system lays bare these discrepancies through relation-
ships that are simultaneously asymmetrical, violent, co-dependent, 
temporary, co-constitutive, productive, painful, and sometimes 
beautiful. In such a system, all the participants, regardless of species 
affiliation, share in different humanities and animalities in the spe-
cific, relational contexts in which they are continually redefined— 
sometimes by choice, but frequently not.
At stake here is not just species difference, but a process of simul-
taneous differentiation and de-differentiation between and within 
species. In the novel, animals and humans become increasingly 
alike, even as their particular names, stories, purposes, geographies, 
and so on emerge, defining them in ways that move beyond the 
generic human and animal. Categorical, racist, and species-based dif-
ferentiation is supplemented through a different kind of differen-
tiation, one that accounts for individual names, physical features, 
experiences, histories, relationships. Although the human/animal 
divide does not exist in some absolute way, the differences among 
human specificity, cow specificity, ostrich specificity, camel specific-
ity, and so forth matters; it is a difference of historicity, location, 
and embodiment, and is not a difference limited to different species, 
but to different populations within those species as well. As Morenga 
notes at one point: “A Hottentot rebel’s horse has nothing in com-
mon with a policeman’s nag in Berlin.”75
Getting at that specificity, the novel suggests, is only possible 
through juxtaposition, comparison, analogy. Morenga uses analogies 
between humans and animals, between different time periods (the 
German colonial period and Nazism), between different landscapes 
to make sense of a world that is constituted by encounters between 
different worlds. Analogy is the mode in which simultaneous dif-
ferentiation and de-differentiation occurs because analogy troubles 
the difference between its terms and thus can force them into fur-
ther refinement. For example, although Gottschalk begins the novel 
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by saying that the South-West African landscape is “like the [Ger-
man] Harz Mountains, but totally denuded and wrung dry,”76 this 
comparison gives way to the recognition that German thoughts and 
language do not match the southern African landscape: “Gottschalk 
brooded over the fact that one’s thoughts and words often failed to 
match the landscape, like pieces of luggage that proved impractical 
once they had been dragged along. For a time Gottschalk had the 
crazy idea of learning a new thought form from the landscape and 
the natives, one that would help him see everything differently.”77 
Here, the questionable analogy between South-West Africa and Ger-
many, which at first effaces difference, ultimately pushes the differ-
ences between the landscapes into higher relief, calling for a new 
language and form of thinking. Analogy gives way to comparison, 
defining a mode of perception in which seeing through likeness is 
also about seeing difference.
The practice of analogical thinking—be it in comparing racial 
others to animals, animal slaughter to the Holocaust, or in com-
paring different historical periods—is controversial from the per-
spectives of human rights and of defining an ethical relationship to 
animals. Haraway argues against analogical thinking as collapsing 
“all of man’s others into one another.”78 Thus, she argues in favor 
of activist Adams’s notion of intersectionality from Neither Man nor 
Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals, which also opposes ana-
logical thinking: “From a humanocentric perspective of oppressed 
peoples who have been, if not equated with animals, treated like 
animals, the introduction of animals to resistance politics suggests 
that, once again, even in resistance humans are being equated with 
animals. But again, this is a result of thinking analogically, of seeing 
oppression as additive, rather than comprehending the interlocking 
systems of domination.”79 As a feminist activist, Adams urges an in-
tersectional view that does not take oppression of any one group as 
separable from other systems of oppression. For her, separability is 
the grounds of analogy or comparison.
 Animal studies scholarship, even while displaying ambivalence to-
ward analogical practices, on principle opposes the “humanocentric” 
perspective that Adams adopts in advocating for intersectionality 
—the perspective from which animality is lesser, lower, or simply 
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bad; indeed, it points to that humanocentrism as a position to 
avoid. For many scholars in animal studies, the oppression of ani-
mals is the root cause of other systems of oppression. In her article 
“What Is Wrong with (Animal) Rights?” Kelly Oliver, like Adams, 
looks at the ways in which women have historically been compared 
to animals and then notes:
If women’s subordination is in part justified by comparing them to animals, 
then perhaps one reason why women’s liberation has continued to meet with 
resistance and continued to bump up against the “glass ceiling” is because of 
our attitudes toward animals and the deep patriarchal associations between 
women and animals. . . . Until we address the denigration of animals in West-
ern thought, on the conceptual level, if not also on the material economic 
level, we continue merely to scratch the surface of the denigration and exploi-
tation of various groups of people, from playboy bunnies to prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib who were treated like dogs as a matter of explicit military policy.80 
I quote Oliver at length because this argument is often galvanized 
as the raison d’être for animal studies. If we can “fix” that oppres-
sion, we can fix them all. Oliver, like Morenga, clearly appeals to 
analogical thinking about oppression, even as she later points out 
that the discourse of rights is flawed because it depends on likeness 
between beings as a precondition for rights: “Just as feminists have 
asked why women have to be like men in order to be equal, we can 
ask, Why do animals have to be like us to have inherent value? The 
notion that man is the measure of all things is precisely the kind of 
thinking that justifies exploiting animals, along with women and 
the earth, for his purposes.”81 Here, too, even in affirming differ-
ence, Oliver uses analogy to extend what has been true of feminist 
arguments to animals. 
Between Adams and Oliver, analogical thinking emerges as simul-
taneously necessary in moving beyond an anthropocentric point 
of view and undesirable in perpetuating comparisons that have 
been damaging to human populations. Oliver addresses this ten-
sion in discussing the problem with rights discourse. She notes that 
at some point, inevitably, the interests of different populations, be 
they human or animal, diverge, and it becomes impossible to guar-
antee rights to some people or animals without excluding others. 
To return to Gottschalk’s lifesaving procedure on Soft-Mouth, this 
dynamic is clearly at play. The calf must be sawed up—killed—and 
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removed in order for its mother to live: both animals cannot be 
saved. The problem is further exacerbated because there is no way to 
determine which way, which choice is “right.” Oliver notes that the 
hazard lies in “assuming that we can calculate the incalculable, that 
we can decide the undecidable, that we can be certain about what is 
just, fair, equal, or right.”82 The debate over analogical thinking and 
its appropriateness in both animal studies and postcolonial studies 
is always caught between loyalties.83 
This tension highlights what Derrida’s use of analogy, as we saw 
earlier, exemplifies: analogy is multidirectional and therefore is never 
only about similarity. The multidirectionality of analogy is, indeed, 
one of the ways in which it is intersectional, in Adams’s terms. Anal-
ogies between historical periods are not the same as comparisons 
between racialized human populations and a universal idea of the 
animal. While most scholars treat all analogical thinking as issuing 
from the same general precepts, historical analogies (between, for 
example, contemporary animal slaughter and the Holocaust) create 
trajectories different from analogies between a human population 
and a fixed notion of the animal. Historical analogies are what we 
might call “vertical,” even when part of their effect is to collapse 
the difference in time between their terms. And analogies that ani-
malize populations are what we might call horizontal, even though 
the animalization of certain human populations entails a notion 
of “backwardness,” as if those racial Others issued from the past. 
The vertical is implicated in the horizontal and vice versa, but the 
two forms of analogy are not the same. This multidirectionality is 
what makes analogical thinking a layered form of intersectionality.
The analogies in Morenga attest to the overlaps between vertical 
and horizontal analogies, all while also pointing to their differences. 
The analogical animals in the novel lay bare the intersectional 
trajectories of oppression. Gottschalk’s encounter with the German 
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“concentration camp” upon his arrival in the protectorate exempli-
fies a horizontal analogy in the juxtaposition of the starving ani-
mals with the native peoples who are “halfway between humans 
and skeletons.”84 It also exemplifies a vertical analogy in the use of 
the term concentration camp—a term that clearly refers to a future 
beyond the novel’s historical scope, even though, as Morenga tells 
us, the concentration-camp notion comes from the British Boer War 
in South Africa (1899–1902).85 This vertical analogy, based in a his-
torical recycling of a term, points to the inherent role of analogy in 
history by virtue of language and terminologies that get reused. This 
“problem” of language is one that Derrida’s coining of l’animot also 
raises, highlighting the ways in which words and their associated 
conceptual baggage often use us as much as we use them. 
Morenga never has to make many historical analogical gestures be-
cause analogy is inherent in the language: in the term concentration 
camp and the theoretical racism that the novel lays bare over and 
over again. In addition to compiling different historically based fic-
tional accounts surrounding different characters, Morenga contains 
a range of reproductions of historical documents that showcase the 
theoretical racism behind colonialism and other oppressions. For in-
stance, there are several pages of official correspondence from the 
Archives of the Government of German South-West Africa in which 
officials debate the proper means and methods for flogging Africans 
(rope or hippo-hide whip?). One von Doering writes the imperial 
government in Windhoek, in 1906, as follows: 
I wish . . . to suggest considering whether it might not be deemed appropriate 
to approach the Colonial Division of the Foreign Office with a suggestion to 
the effect that the hippo-hide whip be replaced as a means of punishment by 
a return to our traditional rope. . . . The blows of a hippo-hide whip almost 
inevitably tear gashes in the skin, and precisely in an area which is hardest for 
others to see, and particularly difficult to see for the injured man. It is there-
fore extremely difficult for the man who has been flogged to care for him-
self. . . . Flogging with a rope is a far different matter. . . . The consequences 
aren’t nearly so severe, they are milder, more humane and yet of more lasting 
pedagogical effect.86 
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Such passages exemplify both the very material considerations of 
colonial power and their connection to structures of pedagogical 
humanistic thought about what constitutes humane treatment (in 
this case, torture) of “inferiors.” These moments of theorizing the 
hierarchical violence inherent in humanism suggest that Timm’s 
narrative seeks to remind German, European, and ultimately inter-
national audiences that, as Pick articulates in Creaturely Poetics, “a 
resuscitation of humanism in the post-Holocaust task of remem-
brance is neither possible nor desirable.”87 
Morenga highlights the fact that humanism is and was a root 
cause not only of the Nazi Holocaust, but of many historical holo-
causts and practices of extreme violence because it is always engaged 
in seeking to pedagogically elevate “inferior” populations. Human-
ism depends on the constant reproduction of hierarchies, inequali-
ties, and violence, and the project of “remembrance,” for Timm, is 
one that must look beyond the horizon of the recent past to see the 
inseparability of humanism and mass violence against both humans 
and animals. Thus, in the novel’s purview, intersectionality might 
be redefined as a modality of analogical thinking and comparison 
through which different oppressions, histories, and ways of being 
are invariably implicated in one another. Whereas for Adams one 
of the problems with analogical thinking is the fact that it posits 
separable terms/forms of oppression, for Morenga it is inseparability 
that grounds analogies between humans and animals and between 
different historical moments. The constant intertwining of modes 
of vertical and horizontal analogies highlights the intersectionality 
of oppressions—and humanism’s role in maintaining them. 
 Analogy, even when not explicitly drawn, is always present. Be-
yond the novel’s use of the term concentration camp, the only other 
analogy between German colonialism and the Holocaust comes in 
the form of several repeated warnings that Gottschalk receives for 
dreaming up his future in South-West Africa. “The Prussian army 
has no room for Jews or dreamers”88 other Germans tell him. Pascale 
Grosse has pointed out that scholars in Germany and the United 
States did not begin connecting German colonialism and the Holo-
caust until the late 1980s: “The scale of the Holocaust overshadowed 
previous events.”89 Since then, studies of German colonialism have 
provided counterarguments to exceptionalist views of the Holocaust 
—in terms of its scale and horror, as well as the exceptionalism of 
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Jewish experience during World War II. The planned extermination 
of the Herero from 1904 to 1907, which killed 50,000—leaving little 
more than 10,000 Herero in all of Africa90—bears obvious resem-
blances to the Holocaust; but while that analogy may be a starting 
point for Morenga, it is not the novel’s end. 
 Instead, the uses of analogy in the novel are indicative of the im-
possibility of a singular, species-specific narrative of history. Histori-
cal juxtapositions between the times and animals of Gorth, Klügge, 
Treptow, and Gottschalk destabilize the centrality of any one of 
the periods, and also points to the inseparability of and intersec-
tional relationship among the present (Gottschalk’s era), the past 
(Gorth, Klügge, and Treptow), and the future (the Holocaust). But 
even though different historical periods are inseparable, differences 
among them emerge. None of the periods map onto each other. The 
missionary, mercantile, and settler periods of colonialism are all dif-
ferent, but they all connect to the Herero war and past abuses in-
forming the native revolt without relating in a simply causal way. 
 History in Morenga is analogical, because it is multidirectional, 
intersectional, and relational, much as different animalities are in-
tersectional and relational and so simultaneously similar and differ-
ent. While Morenga might well agree with Haraway’s position that 
“[d]ifferent atrocities deserve their own languages, even if there are 
no words for what we do,”91 its answer to the question of whether 
we should compare animal slaughter to the Holocaust might not be 
as categorical as Haraway’s and Adams’s. Indeed, it seems more in 
line with Derrida’s use of the analogy between animal extermination 
and the Holocaust: a staging of an encounter that draws likeness, as 
well as significant difference through multidirectional comparisons. 
 As we saw in the earlier example of Gottschalk’s comparison of 
the African landscape to the Harz Mountains of Germany, analo-
gies in Morenga serve as preliminary definitions of relationships and 
ways of understanding when we may not, indeed, have words for 
what we do or see. Gottschalk’s later position of seeking to learn 
from the land and its people a new thought and language indicates 
a significant, perhaps even radical departure from his earlier ana-
logical mode, at least in terms of his understanding of the African 
landscape. Analogical thinking about animals, however—defined by 
animals resembling humans, as well as humans resembling animals— 
permeates the novel through to its end. As we have already seen, 
these analogies function as mechanisms of de-differentiation, while 
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also performing differentiations between specifically characterized 
animalities and histories. 
 Analogical thinking, Morenga shows, is not necessarily a thinking 
without difference, or a thinking that collapses difference; rather, 
it can also be a way of thinking through differences so that the end-
point is neither boundless difference nor complete equation. The 
“end” is a much more ambiguous stance. Animals are neither ani-
mal nor human, and they are both animal and human. The present 
is neither the past nor the future, and both past and future. But 
these terms are also not the whole story. Specific, individual ani-
mals are many more things than merely animal or human can ac-
count for, just as each particular time period or moment is always 
also quite different from any other time. Such a view might be in-
tersectional in Adams’s sense, but only from the standpoint that the 
intersectional is also always-already implicated in the analogical—in 
fact, it emerges through it. 
 The categorical ambiguity that rests in this kind of intersectional 
analogical thinking emerges out of taking animals seriously—as his-
torical actors whose lives and stories constantly intersect with hu-
man lives and stories. But it also emerges out of taking literature 
seriously—as a form of narrating histories and lives from multiple 
perspectives that might not otherwise be available in, say, philo-
sophical or biological writing. Literary analogy recognizes both the 
difficulty of drawing clear-cut lines between species and historical 
periods and the necessity of doing so. Morenga’s analogical animals, 
indeed, constantly raise one of Oliver’s central points: How can we 
be certain where the line falls between these like and unlike beings, 
times, things? We cannot be, and analogical thinking in literature, 
Morenga shows, can allow us to dwell in ambiguity without a clear 
answer. That ambiguity is perhaps truer to history and animals—hu-
man and otherwise—whose lives and realities are always emerging 
in layers of relationality. 
 What animal studies may uncover with greater urgency and force 
than any identity-based field that studies oppression and different 
definitions of humanity is the uncertainty underlying all of our very 
human categories that name both real, lived differences and imagined 
ones. The project that Derrida, Haraway, and others have pursued 
in complicating the generic human and animal relies upon critical 
approaches to language and conceptual figures. These figures point 
to the need for simultaneous differentiation and de-differentiation 
that collapses generic, categorical universals in favor of specific, 
located animalities and relationalities. Analogies are crucial to the 
possibility and the process of descriptions that might be faithful 
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to the living entities that people the planet. The question, then, is 
perhaps not should we compare—humans and animals, meatpacking 
and the Holocaust, and so on—but rather what comparisons can we 
best think, see, and speak through, as well as in?
As Cohen’s lamentation of the College Board’s elimination of 
analogies from the SAT reminds us, analogical thinking is a foun-
dational cognitive function, one that provides pathways for un-
derstanding new and different perspectives through comparison. 
Indeed, despite its contested role in animal studies, analogies have 
often structured the field’s framing of its work.92 Their function as 
a mechanism of differentiation and de-differentiation makes them 
crucial figures for scholars in the field. The potential values of anal-
ogy in literary texts like Morenga may also point to the crucial role of 
literary studies in animal studies more broadly. 
As I hope to have made clear, analogical practices need not be 
read or practiced in the tradition of Enlightenment comparative his-
tory that Haraway so criticizes in Costello’s equation of meat con-
sumption with the Holocaust. Indeed, Morenga’s multidirectional 
analogical animals exemplify decidedly nonhumanist comparative 
practices that put pressure on the categories and histories that hu-
manism and humanist thought take for granted in order to open up 
ways of maintaining simultaneous similarity and difference. Much 
as animal studies has worked to deconstruct singular, generic under-
standings and approaches to the animal, so too should scholars, lit-
erary and otherwise, pay heed to the fact that not all analogies and 
analogical practices function in the same ways or toward the same 
ends. Analogies are, in this sense, like animals and animalities—spe-
cifically, historically and contextually defined creatures that draw 
out both similarities and differences in the terms and contexts they 
bring together. This simultaneous similarity and difference is the 
true potential and value of analogical thought to animal studies, 
and, indeed, to the public sphere. 
It is not just, as Cohen notes, that analogy is about logical, ra-
tional thought without which the American public might not be 
able to recognize “false analogies”; it is, rather, that all analogies are 
both true and false in some ways that it is our task to discern. It is 
true that industrialized animal practices are like the practices of Nazi 
Creedon / Difference in animalities and Histories 335
concentration camps; it is also true, as Derrida’s use of that anal-
ogy reveals, that Nazi concentration camps were not like contempo-
rary industrialized animal practices. Those simultaneous, seemingly 
contradictory truths are what make analogical thinking—about 
animals, humans, and histories—useful in recognizing the always- 
already unstable and uncertain natures of human understandings 
and knowledges of ourselves, animals, and the many other life 
forms that constitute the worlds we inhabit. 
